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IN THE SUP'REME C01URT 
0 1F THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
JAMES P. KNUCKLES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12254 
REPLY BRIEF 0'F APPELLANT' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
So that there may not exist any misconception about 
the contents of the record below, defendant-appellant 
will address itself to certain factual assertions of plaintiff-
appellee. 
In his brief, plaintiff-appellee would infer categor-
ically that plaintiff cannot wear a contact lens comfort-
ably without irritation. (See Brief of Appellee at 5, 16.) 
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Rowland H. Merrill at 
the instance of defendant and the contact lens prescribed 
for plaintiff was examined and measured by a contact 
lens manufacturer in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the instance 
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of Doctor Merrill. At trial Doctor Merrill testified as 
follows concerning the results of that examination: 
Q. Thank you. Now, Doctor, have you ever 
treated a patient for cataract removal? 
A. Cataract is a very common condition and 
I have done hundreds of operations for cataracts 
and fitted them after to improve that vision with 
either glasses or contact lens. 
Q. Would you explain to the Court what 
your treatment normally consists? 
A. After the operation for the cataract, we 
usually wait anywhere from one month to three 
or four months before we prescribe glasses. Now 
it depends on the patient, upon his vision whether 
we prescribe glasses or contact lens. The vast ma· 
jority of people involved who have had cataract 
operations and have had experience with contact 
lens and glasses prefer the contact lens to the 
glasses. Because their vision is better, they have 
a wider field of vision and their vision is more 
normal. 
Q. Is the standard procedure among mem· 
hers of your profession to fit people who have 
suffered the loss of lens with a contact lens? 
A. Here again it depends upon the patient, 
the age of the patient, some people are so shak· 
ing [sic] that they can't put a contact lens in the 
eye. And yet I have people over eighty who sue· 
cesfully wear contact lenses and the majority of 
people as I said before prefer contact lenses and 
we usually fit contact lenses unless there is some 
specific reason why we shouldn't fit a contact lens. 
2 
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Q. The patients that you have treated for 
cataract removal, have they adjusted well to the 
use of the contact lens? 
A. The vast majority of people do because 
when we operate on a cataract we cut the eye 
half open. Across the top. That destroys all the 
nerve fibers that go down to the cornea. Some 
of which degenerate, the majority of which do not 
regenerate, so the eye is less sensitive after an 
operation for cataract that it is before an opera-
tion for cataract. These people usually tolerate 
contact lenses very well because as I say, their 
vision is improved. Their sensitivity of the cornea 
is reduced and they make ideal patients. 
Q. How did you have occasion to examine 
the plaintiff, Mr. Knuckles? 
A. Yes, I examined Mr. Knuckles on June 
22d, 1970, in my office in Salt Lake City. 
Q. Of what did your examination consist? 
A. Well, my examination consisted of the 
internal examination which revealed that the pa-
tieq.t was aphakic. Aphakia means the lens of 
the eye has been removed. It also revealed the 
fact that the patient had had an operation for a 
muscle imbalance. And it revealed that his field 
was normal and his vision with the contact lens 
which he was wearing, was twenty, twenty-five 
minus one or two letters. 
Q. Now you mentioned that Mr. Knuckles 
was wearing his contact lens, is that correct? 
A. He was wearing the contact lens when 
he came into the office. 
Q. Now you were here in this court. this 
morning and you heard Mr. Knuckles complam of 
3 
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his difficulty in wearing the contact lens. On the 
basis of your examination of Mr. Knuckles and 
of his lens, do you have an opinion concerning 
the cause of his discomfort? 
A. The comfort in wearing the contact lens 
depends upon several factors. One is the motiva-
tion of the patient. Another is the eye sensitivity 
of the patient. And thirdly, it depends upon the 
fit of the contact lens itself. Now this contact 
lens of Mr. Knuckles I had examined by one of 
our contact lens makers in Salt Lake City. He 
revealed that the lens had bad edges. By bad 
edges we mean the edges are not smooth and they 
were rough. There was no bevel of the contact 
lens. It was a large lens, a lens which ordinarily 
I would expect to be an uncomfortable lens. With 
some improvement in the grinding of the lens I 
think the lens could be made much more accep· 
table to the patient. More tolerable. 
Q. Now, Dr. Merrill, assuming that Mr. 
Knuckles was fitted with a smaller and properly 
fitting contact lens and based on your examina· 
tion of Mr. Knuckles and your experience with 
other patients who are using cataract, I mean using 
contacts with cataract operations, do you have an 
opinion within a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty whether or not the plaintiff should be 
able to wear contact lenses comfortably? 
A. I think if the patient wanted to wear the 
lens, if it were perfectly fitted lens, smooth, well· 
machined and not too heavy, he could wear it 
comfortably. 
(T t 32 35 ) Thus the undisputed evidence in the r. a - . , 
record is that plaintiff could wear a modern, properly 
fitting lens comfortably if he wanted to. Moreover, the 
4 
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evidence is also uncontroverted that with normal glasses 
alone and without a contact lens, plaintiff still had a 
visual acuity of 20/20 or normal vision. (Letter dated 
April 24, 1967, from James P. Rigg, Sr., M.D. to James 
Alexander, M.D., marked as Exhibit I to and identified in 
the deposition of James P. Rigg, Sr. at 29.) Therefore, 
any alleged discomfort of plaintiff was respect to the 
contact lens can be remedied and there is absolutely no 
evidence to demonstrate that plaintiff belongs to that 
small minority of people who for some reason do not 
adjust to contact lenses. Dr. Merrill testified that he 
could not recall a single cataract patient of his that did 
not adjust well to a contact lens. (Tr. at 36.) Even if 
plaintiff did belong to that small minority of people who 
cannot wear contact lenses, his vision could be 20/20 
with normal glasses. The issue on appeal remains the 
same - whether or not under the terms of the insurance 
policy corrective lenses of any type must be considered. 
Also, mention should be made of the fact that plain-
tiff failed to inform his own doctor about any categorical 
or inherent difficulty in wearing his contact lens. In the 
deposition of Robert W. Rigg, M.D., the physician who 
prescribed the contact lens, the following statements are 
found: 
Q. Has he ever expressed to you, as far as 
your recollection or your notes would indicate, any 
particular problem in wearing the lens? 
A. He related one specific instance I wrote 
down here, when he said he couldn't wear it at 
work. I presume because of the work he was 
doing. It probably got dust and dirt and such 
5 
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under the contact. I don't even know whether 
he's wearing it now; but he has at times worn it 
and worn it quite well. 
Q. What makes you say that he has at times 
worn it and worn it well? 
A. Well, because he's related that he has 
been able to wear it at times. In other words, -
well, or that he hasn't. For instance in November 
of '68, he mentioned according to him that he was 
not wearing his contact because of his work. And, 
actually, I'm not even sure how much he had been 
wearing it successfully because I have no specific 
references as to what his total hours of unwearing 
have been. I've only seen him twice since his last 
muscle surgery on his eye; so I really can't say 
that I could speak with any authenticity as to 
how much he's wearing it because he might be 
wearing it all the time and he might not. I don't 
know today what he's been doing. 
Q. So, he hasn't indicated to you one way 
or the other? 
A. I have not seen him. 
(Deposition of Dr. Robert W. Rigg at 13.) 
It would seem that if plaintiff actually had great diffi· 
culty in wearing the lens during his off duty hours and 
if he really was concerned about improving his vision, he 
would have indicated his alleged problems in wearing 
the lens to his physician sometime between 1968 and the 
date of trial. In plaintiff's own deposition taken before 
trial, he again failed to mention that he could not wear 
the lens outside of his place of employment: 
6 
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Q. When were you fitted with the contact 
lens? 
A. Let's see, that's been I think about the 
last part of '68. 
Q. How often do you wear it? 
A. Well, I can't wear it down to the mine. 
And usually when I get home it's a bother to put 
it on just for a few minutes. So I get it out on 
my days off and wear it a lot of time and try to 
get used to wearing it. When I have a lot of time. 
(Deposition of plaintiff at 32.) 
Here, plaintiff says nothing about irritation, only that 
the lens is a "bother" to put on. He even stated that "he 
wears it a lot of time." Dr. Merrill testified that plain-
tiff should be able to adjust to the contact lens during 
his off duty hours so that he could wear the lens com-
fortaby. (Tr. at 35-36.) In sum, the evidence would indi-
cate that plaintiff might have been exaggerating his dis-
comfort with the lens at trial. Any real discomfort can 
be explained on the basis of the defects in the lens diag-
nosed pursuant to Doctor Merrill's examination. In any 
event, plaintiff's ability or inability to wear a contact 
lens comfortably did not enter into the lower court's de- · 
termination. (Paragraph 3 of Order dated September 
14, 1970.) 
Plaintiff-appellee also makes the assertion that the 
prognosis for the life of plaintiff's injured eye is 10 years. 
(Brief of Appellee at 16.) There is absolutely no basis 
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in the record relative to plaintiff's injury that would sup-
port the conclusion that the expected life of plaintiff's 
eye is 10 years. The basis for plaintiff's assertion is prob-
ably the following statements by Dr. Robert W. Rigg: 
Q. With a man the age of Mr. Knuckles, is 
there any possibility that he'll outlive that eye? 
A. It's been reported that the average age 
of a cataract, an eye that has had a cataract re-
moved, is about ten years. They are more prone 
to have retinal detachment and other conditions 
of their eye than the average eye, than a normal 
eye, I should say. 
Q. What is this statistic of ten years that 
you mentioned? 
A. This has been quoted. That's all. But, 
some go along fine for a long period of time and 
some don't. Some of this also relates to the initial 
injury, as to how severe it was and what was the 
original problem. 
(Deposition of Robert W. Rigg at 19-20.) This state· 
ment is in no way connected to plaintiff's injury, nor is 
the source of the alleged report given, nor is the opinion 
offered as the concerted opinion of Doctor Rigg. Cer· 
tainly, if plaintiff at some later date does in fact suffer 
the total and irrecoverable loss of sight as feared, then is 
when a claim should be brought under this policy. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CASES CITED BY PLAINTIFF-APPEL-
LEE ARE NOT IN POINT. 
Plaintiff-appellee has failed to cite one case that is 
m point to the facts and issues presented in this case. 
There is only one case cited in appellee' s brief that was 
concerned with a policy containing the language iden-
tical with the language of the insurance policy in this 
case. And in that case, Clark v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 
43 Cal. App.2d 563, 111 P.2d 354, reh. denied 43 Cal. 
App. 2d 563, 112 P.2d 298 (1941), the plaintiff suffered 
a detached retina and there is no evidence that any medi-
cal procedures could ever rectify plaintiff's sight. All of 
the remaining decisions cited by appellee either construe 
policies which require only the "entire loss of sight" and 
not the "total and irrecoverable loss of sight," or inter-
pret work.mens compensation decisions which do not ap-
ply to the facts of this case. 
Appelle relies on various workmens compensation 
decisions which stand for the proposition that artificial 
lenses do not change the permanent character of the in-
jury to the claimant and can therefore be disregarded. 
However, the issue in this case is not whether plaintiff's 
loss of sight is permanent, but whether plaintiff's sight 
is total and cannot be recovered, remedied or rectified. 
As indicated in Wallace v. Insurance Company of North 
America, 415 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1969), the word "per-
manent" as used in a Kentucky workmens compensation 
9 
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statute did not imply an attempt to recover sight as did 
the term "irrecoverable" as used in the applicable in-
surance contract. It is inconceivable that the use of cor-
rective lenses could be disregarded in determining the 
issue of the extent of the recovery of sight. 
Appellee argues by analogy to a situation in which a 
claimant has lost a limb and thereafter is fitted with an 
artificial appliance. It is asserted that the artificial ap-
pliance itself, like the lenses in this case, points up the 
fact of the loss and the permanency of the injury. Ap-
pellant does not argue that there was a loss and that 
the loss without surgery and corrective lenses would be 
permanent. Nevertheless, the issue in this case is wheth-
er this loss has been rectified by surgery and corrective 
lenses. The facts of this case are more appropriately anal-
agous to a situation in which a person suffered an injury 
to an arm or a leg, causing a temporary diminution in 
the use of said limb, but which could be entirely rectified 
through the use of a steel pin or an unobtrusive brace. 
Certainly, in this type of situation, there would be no 
grounds for recovery under an insurance policy which in-
sured against the severance of an arm or a leg at a par· 
ticular point or even against the total and irrecoverable 
loss of use. It is incongruous to speak in terms of total 
and irrecoverable loss of use if the subject limb were 
capable of normal function. The language cited by the 
court in Southland Life Insurance Company v. Dunn, 71 
S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) is applicable: 
One who sustains a broken arm suffers the 
loss of the use of such arm. If proper treatment 
10 
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be not had, such loss may become irrecoverable 
but no one would contend that a mere broke~ 
arm ordinarily constitutes an entire and irrecov-
erable loss of its use. 
We can see no valid reason why one who has 
suffered he entire loss of sight by cataracts on his 
eyes is not governed by the same considerations. 
The evidence is certainly sufficient to raise an is-
sue as to whether an ordinarily prudent person 
under such circumstances would undergo an op-
eration for removal of the cataracts. The evidence 
also shows the loss of sight may be restored or 
substantially improved. In the one event the loss 
sight would be recovered; in the other event it 
would be partially recovered, thus creating a par-
tial rather than a complete disability. 
In either event the plaintiff in this case could 
not recover because under the terms of the policy 
the loss of sight in both eyes must be "entire and 
irrecoverable.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff has not suffered the total and irrecov-
erable loss of sight in one eye within the meaning of the 
policy. Through surgery and the use of modern correc-
tive lenses, plaintiff has indeed recovered the sight lost 
resulting from his unfortunate injury. The cases cited 
by plaintiff-appellee are not applicable to the legal issues 
presented in this case. This Court should avoid the result 
warned against in the case cited by plaintiff-appellee of 
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United 
States, 94 Utah 532, 544, 72 P.2d 1060, 1065-66 (1937): 
But the cases annotated in this same note show 
that by a process of judicial erosion the courts have 
11 
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in many cases so "liberalized" the language of the 
policy as to extend it beyond what was fairly 
within its terms. 
In Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga. 392, 
138 S.E. 787, at page 790, it is stated: 
Policies of insurance will be liberally 
construed in favor of the object to be accom. 
plished, and provisions therein will be strictly 
construed against the insurer. * * * But the 
contract of insurance should be construed so 
as to carry out the true intention of the par-
ties. * * * The rights of the parties are to 
be determined by the terms of the policy, so 
far as they are lawful. The language of the 
contract should be construed as a whole, and 
should receive a reasonable construction, and 
not be extended beyond what is fairly within 
the terms of the policy. Where the language 
is unambiguous and but one reasonable con-
struction of the contract is possible, the court 
must expound it as made." 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed, 
with orders that defendant-appellant is entitled to a judg-
ment against plaintiff dismissing the action with prejudice 
as requested in defendant's Motion to Amend the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORN\-V ALL & McCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis 
Roger H. Thompson 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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